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Resumo: O objetivo do trabalho é entender aspectos das inter-relações entre a estrutura do 
setor bancário e políticas públicas típicas de bancos centrais. No primeiro artigo, analisamos a 
política monetária e o seu potencial impacto sobre a competição bancária. Argumentamos que a 
política monetária afeta a competição bancária na medida em que não afete todos os bancos 
igualmente. Bancos de varejo dispõem de fontes de recurso relativamente insensíveis à taxa 
básica de juros e, portanto, são mais eficientes em um contexto de taxas básicas de juros 
elevadas. Como o modelo de negócios de banco de varejo possui barreiras à entrada 
significativas, conjecturamos que taxa de juros básica condiciona, em algum grau, a competição 
bancária. Tal conjectura é investigada tanto teoricamente quanto empiricamente. No segundo 
artigo, analisamos teoricamente os potenciais impactos da estrutura do setor bancário sobre as 
políticas prudenciais. O racional é simples: o processo decisório dos agentes varia conforme a 
estrutura do mercado. Em particular, argumentamos que há diferentes restrições ligadas à 
estrutura de mercado que mudam a forma em que os requerimentos prudenciais são 
incorporados nas decisões de preço e de risco. No terceiro artigo, invertemos tal pergunta e 
analisamos empiricamente o impacto de políticas prudenciais que discriminam o tratamento de 
acordo com o porte sobre a estrutura do mercado bancário. Argumentamos que o regime de 
proporcionalidade introduzido no Brasil fomentou o crescimento das instituições menores. 




Abstract: This work seeks to understand features governing the relationship between bank 
market structure and Central Bank policies. In the first article, we analyze how monetary policy 
can impact bank competition. We argue that monetary policy may not affect all banks in the same 
manner. In fact, retail funded banks are not as sensitive to variations in the policy rate and are 
more efficient in a high policy rate environment. As the business model of a retail bank carries 
significant barriers to entry, we argue that the policy rate is a factor in the level of bank competition. 
Such conjecture is investigated both theoretically and empirically. In the second article, we 
investigate how bank market structure may affect prudential policies. The underlying hypothesis 
is straightforward: the decision-making is conditioned by the market structure. In particular, we 
argue that varying market structure constraints change the way prudential requirements are 
reflected in loan rates and in bank risk-taking. In the third article, we reverse this question and try 
to identify the empirical effects of prudential policies under a size-based proportionality framework 
on bank competition. We argue that the new proportionality regime introduced in Brazil fostered 
the growth of the smaller banks. 






















“We have not succeeded in answering all our problems. The answers we have found only 
serve to raise a whole set of new questions. In some ways we feel as confused as ever, 
but we believe we are confused on a higher level and about more important things.” 
Posted outside the mathematics reading room 
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 This work contributes to the literature in three ways. First, by investigating how monetary 
policy may affect bank competition. While the literature has identified the beginning of our story, 
by establishing that bigger banks are less affected by monetary policy shocks (TABAK, LAIZ, and 
CAJUEIRO, 2013), and its end, by pointing out that spreads increase when the policy rate 
increase (GERTLER and KARADI, 2015), there is a void in between that we seek to fill. 
 Our starting point is that monetary policy does not seem to affect all banks in the same 
manner, and that funding strategies can go a long way in explaining differences in bank behavior 
(KHAN, SCHEULE, and WU, 2017). From the assumption that retail funded banks are not as 
sensitive to variations in the policy rate and are more efficient in a high policy rate environment, 
we argue that the policy rate is a factor in the level of bank competition using a simple theoretical 
model. Such reasoning is tested on large cross-country panels, both at the country-level and at 
the bank-level, and we find compatible results. 
 The second and the third contributions of this work are related to the study of prudential 
policies. We explore the effects of prudential policies under multiple market competition regimes 
using a theoretical model that allows us to compare how prudential polices fare in each 
environment. Our results contribute to the literature by enriching the model developed by ARPING 
(2017), enabling it to be a tool to evaluate prudential policies. By doing so, we reach novel 
conclusions regarding the effects of prudential policies. For instance, we show that capital and 
liquidity requirements may actually reduce credit spreads, a counterintuitive conclusion that, to 
the best of our knowledge, is original. 
 Last but not least, we open a new frontier in the study of prudential policies by focusing 
on the competition effects of size-based proportionality, that is, prudential policies whose 
requirements vary according to the size of the bank. Our main point underlying this contribution 
is that understanding size-based proportionality is fundamentally different, in terms of its effects 
on competition, from prudential requirements applied equally to all institutions or specifically to 
institutions on a case-by-case basis. As far as we are aware, no other work had this research 
question. Our work is centered on the empirical effects of size-based proportionality measures 
introduced in Brazil during the 2010s. 
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 This chapter offers empirical evidence that monetary policy influences both the banking 
sector structure, as measured by its concentration, and the banking lending spread. Using a large 
cross-country data set, we find that increases in the policy rate are associated with higher bank 
concentration and wider spreads. To make sense of the results, we posit a simple model that 
provides an explanation based on differences in funding strategies. Our model assumes that 
banks with retail funding are less sensitive to variations in the policy rate, a hypothesis we verify 
with bank-level data from BANKSCOPE. 
We argue that a high policy rate environment favors funding strategies that entail 
significant entry costs, making them relatively efficient. Thus, when the policy rate increases, 
business is diverted to banks with policy rate insensitive funding strategies and away from banks 
with market-based funding strategies, which cannot seamlessly switch to these strategies due to 
the associated entry costs. Facing higher marginal costs, banks with market-based funding 
strategies reduce their output. As policy rate insensitive funding strategies have high fixed costs, 
they tend to be adopted by the largest banks1, which now face relatively inefficient competitors. 
As a result, concentration might increase and spread might widen.  
Our work circumvents more in-depth discussions on the contentious issue of what exactly 
characterizes the level of competition and whether it is always reflected by bank concentration 
and by lending spreads. In fact, although concentration and price margin measures alone may 
not determine the competitiveness of the banking sector, the scope of this work is not to ultimately 
discern other possible drivers of bank competition or, more importantly, to ascertain its level. 
Therefore, we argue that a more direct approach is warranted. For instance, the usual rationale 
for using structural metrics of competition instead of measures of performance or measures of 
concentration usually involves country-specific factors affecting entry (see CLAESSENS and 
                                                          
1
 Using the data from BANKSCOPE, we find that only in the United States of America and in Cape Verde the average 
correlation between loan market share and the proportion of deposit funding is negative. In the case of Cape Verde, 
some years have only two observations and they skew the results.  
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LAEVEN, 2004), issues we do not seek to investigate. We are interested solely in the marginal 
effects of monetary policy on bank competition. In other words, while it might be true that a 
concentrated banking sector can display intense competition that point is not relevant to this work 
unless simultaneous increases in concentration and in price margin reflect an unchanged degree 
of competition. 
 Establishing the empirical relevance of the effect of monetary policy on the banking sector 
market structure and conduct has broad implications. Besides the welfare effects inherent to wider 
spreads and less market depth, the monetary policy itself may be affected (see VAN 
LEUVENSTEIJN et al., 2008).  For instance, a non-competitive banking sector may hinder the 
transmission of monetary policy, as LENSINK and STERKEN (2002) have argued. However, we 
argue that the main practical implication of this finding is that reductions in the monetary policy 
rate or in the reserve requirement rate on term deposits potentially amount to pro-competition 
policies for the banking sector. 
 This chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature, presenting a brief review of the studies on the relationship between bank competition 
and monetary policy, and on how monetary policy may affect spreads. In section 3, we lay out the 
theoretical model and the accompanying results we take to the data, which is described in the 
next section. Sections 5 and 6 contain the methodology and the empirical results, respectively, 
while section 7 provides bank-level estimates. Section 8 ends the chapter. 
2. Literature review 
The literature has established that policy rates influence the behavior of banks. In fact, 
the efficacy of the monetary policy transmission mechanism hinges, to an important extent, on 
how banks pass the policy-induced changes in money market interest rates along to their 
customers, the so-called bank lending channel of monetary policy (see KASHYAP and STEIN, 
1995 and 2000). However, the literature on how monetary policy affects banking sector market 
structure and conduct is scant. 
That monetary policy can have a bearing on bank competition is a point first made by 
BAGLIANO, DALMAZZO, and MARINI (2000). Using the framework of ROTEMBERG and 
SALONER (1986), they show how monetary policy decisions can influence banks’ incentives to 
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collude. In fact, the policy rate can be viewed as the cost of adding capacity in the short-term and 
worthwhile deviations from an implicit collusion arrangement require either idle capacity or the 
ability to increase capacity in the short-term. Therefore, the stability of such anticompetitive 
arrangements is affected by the policy rate. BAGLIANO, DALMAZZO, and MARINI (2000) 
demonstrate that a countercyclical monetary policy may foster implicit collusion among banks, 
since the higher cost of funding during booms would erode capacity exactly when deviations 
would be otherwise more likely. Their conclusion is a new contribution to the literature concerned 
with the bank lending channel of monetary policy, as bank competition would function as an 
indirect amplification mechanism of movements in the policy rate. 
TOOLSEMA (2004) develops a different model of competition to analyze how monetary 
policy may affect the degree of market power and reaches an opposing conclusion. TOOLSEMA 
(2004) applies the SALOP (1979) model of horizontal product differentiation and confirms the 
finding of BAGLIANO, DALMAZZO, and MARINI (2000) that monetary policy has consequences 
to the market power of banks. However, according to TOOLSEMA (2004), the LERNER (1934) 
index2 is negatively related to the policy rate, while the implicit collusion model of BAGLIANO, 
DALMAZZO, and MARINI (2000) would lead to the opposite conclusion. The conclusion of 
TOOLSEMA (2004) rests on the fact that banks may not be able to fully incorporate the higher 
marginal cost represented by the higher policy rate into their lending rates, depressing their Lerner 
index. 
Our work reinforces the conclusions of BAGLIANO, DALMAZZO, and MARINI (2000) and 
also provides an amplification mechanism to monetary policy based on bank competition. The 
usual tool for monetary policy, small movements in short term rates, appear to have a significant 
effect on economic activity.  GERTLER and KARADI (2015) show that substantial movements in 
credit costs following modest changes in short rates are mainly because of term premium and 
credit spreads. In explaining their findings, they point to the various theories of the bank lending 
channel and argue that the tightening of the monetary policy carries a tightening of financial 
constraints. We, on the other hand, focus on the repercussions on competition but reach a similar 
conclusion, that is, spreads may amplify movements in the policy rate. 
                                                          
2
 The Lerner index is the mark-up over marginal cost, shown as a percentage. 
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3. A simple model of bank competition 
 We develop a simple model of bank competition to give a rigorous footing to our 
conjectures. Our model does not provide the direct specification of the equations we take to the 
data. In other words, we are not interested in estimating the specific parameters embedded in its 
formulation, but on clearly articulating our conjectures.  
Following LEUVENSTEIJN et al. (2007), we consider a banking sector in which banks 
produce a single product (or portfolio of banking products) in a Cournot-Nash setting3 and face a 
linear demand curve, that is, price ?? charged by bank ? depends linearly on the output of bank ? 
and of the other banks, as shown in equation 1 below: 
????? , ????? = ? − ??? − ?Σ?????   (eq. 1) 
 However, unlike LEUVENSTEIJN et al. (2007), we assume that banks have a different 
marginal cost depending on their business model. In the model considered, banks can rely either 
on wholesale funding or on retail funding. We assume that the cost of funding of retail banks is 
lower than the cost of market-based wholesale funding and not as sensitive to the policy rate. 
That is, each bank has marginal cost ??? which is assumed to be ?? + ?????? for a retail-funded 
bank or ?? + ?????? for a wholesale-funded bank, where ?? ≤ ??, ?? < ??, ???? stands for the 
short-term policy rate. 
The assumption that banks are not equally affected by monetary policy is not new. Using 
data from European banks, FUNGÁČOVÁ, SOLANKO, and WEILL (2014) find that banks with 
more market power, as measured by the Lerner index, are less affected by monetary policy and 
point to funding advantages as a probable cause. Similarly, but using data from Brazilian banks, 
TABAK, LAIZ, and CAJUEIRO (2013) show that larger banks are less impacted by monetary 
policy shocks. 
By distinguishing banks based on funding strategies, we acknowledge the findings of 
DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT and HUIZINGA (2010), as they show that differences in funding are related 
to performance, with deposit funding being a driver for increased performance and stability. In a 
                                                          
3
 SCHLIEPHAKE and KIRSTEIN (2013) show that even if banks compete on prices, the existence of capital 
requirements provides a justification for the use of a Cournot-Nash setting. 
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similar vein, others have pointed that how much asset risk banks take, i.e. their output, depends 
on their source of funding. VAZQUEZ and FEDERICO (2015) show that banks with weaker 
structural liquidity, that is, more dependent on wholesale funding, were more vulnerable to failure 
during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). KHAN, SCHEULE, and WU (2017) confirm that banks 
with higher deposit ratios took less risk during the GFC, but also found that they usually do the 
opposite, as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets. 
 We also assume that there is a fixed number of retail-funded banks ?? and that the overall 
number of banks ? is also constant. With symmetry, equation 1 becomes equations 2 and 3 
below: 
??(?? , ??) = ? − ??? − ??(?? − 1)?? + (? − ??)???  (eq. 2)??(??, ??) = ? − ??? − ?(???? + (? − ?? − 1)??)  (eq. 3)  
 That is, we have a symmetrical equilibrium given by four variables (?? , ?? , ?? , ??), and 
we show that an increase in ???? leads to an increase in the market share of retail banks at the 
same time that it allows these banks to widen their spreads. In other words: 
Proposition 1.  If the sensitivity of the marginal cost of the wholesale-funded banks to the 
monetary policy, ??, is sufficiently greater than the sensitivity of the marginal cost of the retail-
funded banks to the monetary policy, ??, then the derivative of the output of a retail funded-bank ?? with respect to the policy rate ????, ???/?????, is non-negative while the derivative of the output 
of a wholesale funded-bank ?? with respect to the policy rate ????, ???/?????, is negative. In other 
words, if the larger banks are retail-funded, the derivative of bank concentration with respect to 
the policy rate ???? is positive under such assumptions. 
Proposition 2. If the overall number of banks, ?, is sufficiently large and sufficiently greater than 
the number of retail-funded banks, ??, then the derivative of the price charged by retail-funded 
banks ??(?? , ??) with respect to the policy rate ????, ???(?? , ??)/?????, is bigger than one. In other 
words, an increase in the policy rate leads to a wider spread.  
We highlight that the agents we call banks may not be banks in the legal sense of a 
chartered bank. For instance, we include in our definition of wholesale-funded banks any credit 
granting entity which obtains funding at rates highly correlated to the policy rate. Therefore, a 
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large number of “banks” is not a strong assumption for economies with developed capital markets. 
For instance, private credit funds and securitization structures are not wholesale-funded banks 
but may compete with retail-funded banks in the credit market as if they were. 
Since Propositions 1 and 2 disregard entry and exit decisions, we interpreted them as 
short-term marginal effects. However, if we consider entry and exit decisions, monetary policy 
also has a clear implication in terms of bank competition in the long run. Assuming that the entry 
costs required for a retail funding operation are ?? while the entry costs for wholesale funding 
operation is ??, ?? > ??, then a very low policy rate, that is, ????~0, would effectively undermine 
any funding advantage obtained by incurring ??. Therefore, the effective entry cost to the credit 
market would be ??. In other words, no entrant to the credit market would opt for a relatively 
costly commercial bank charter in a very low policy rate environment, even though the overall 
amount of credit granted would probably grow in this circumstance. 
4. Data  
 Several datasets are combined for the estimations. We collect most of the variables the 
Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) of the World Bank (see ČIHÁK et al, 2012). For 
the monetary policy rate, we use the Central Bank policy rate as found in the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund. The variables on reserve 
requirements are from the dataset of FEDERICO, VEGH, and VULETIN (2014). As for a list of 
the countries and periods in which monetary policy followed an inflation targeting regime, this 
information came from FAZIO, TABAK, and CAJUEIRO (2015). Contestability variables are from 
surveys by BARTH, CAPRIO, and LEVINE (2013) and there are also financial freedom indexes 
calculated by the Heritage Foundation, also as proxies for the presence of regulatory constraints 
on entry. Finally, the use of macroprudential instruments is from CERUTTI, CLAESSENS, and 
LAEVEN (2017), who devised a Macroprudential Index summing dummies for the application of 
12 macroprudential policies. The variables and their main statistics are presented in Tables 1, 2, 





 Based on the variables described in Table 1 above, we also design several dummies. 
There is a dummy for bank concentration, which is unity if the variable bank concentration is 
above 70% (57% of the sample). In the same fashion, there is a dummy for entry requirements, 
which is one if the average for the entry requirements metric in all four surveys (1999, 2002, 2006 
and 2011) is above 7 (54% of the sample). There is a dummy for nonbanks participation, which 
is one if nonbank financial institutions’ assets are over 40% of the total assets of nonbanks and 
banks combined (13% of the sample). We also have a dummy for rich countries, which is unity if 
GDP per capita is over thirty thousand 2005 US dollars (9% of the sample). Finally, a dummy for 
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Index Use of macroprudential policies, covering 12 of them. Source: Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven, 2017.
Table 1. Description and Definition of Variables
Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Source: Čihák et 
al, 2012 (GFDD).
Difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Lending rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to the 
private sector and deposit interest rate is the rate offered by commercial banks on three-month deposits. 
Source: Čihák et al, 2012 (GFDD).
Central bank policy rate, percent per annum. Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. Source: Čihák et al, 2012 (GFDD).
Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit money banks comprise commercial 
banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits. Source: 
Čihák et al, 2012 (GFDD).
Total assets held by financial institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but that perform financial 
intermediation by accepting other types of deposits or by issuing securities or other liabilities that are close 
substitutes for deposits as a share of GDP. Source: Čihák et al, 2012 (GFDD).
Countries and periods in which monetary policy followed an inflation targeting regime. Source: Fazio, Tabak 
and Cajueiro, 2015.
Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence from 
government control and interference in the financial sector. Source: Heritage Foundation.
For countries and periods in which there were different reserve requirements for term deposits and demand 
deposits, this variable is difference between rate for term deposits and demand deposits. In case there were 
multiple rates for either demand deposits or term deposits, the difference is calculated between averages. 
Source: Federico, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2014.





   
 
Variable name Mean Median
Std. 
Deviation Min Max
Bank concentration 72.76806 74.27375 20.0805 17.2872 100
Bank lending-deposit 
spread
7.890605 6.10833 7.379928 0.025001 91.7583
Policy rate 8.146759 5 13.08901 0.02 200
Deposit money banks' 
assets to GDP 42.23331 30.70035 37.25959 0.000026 263.126
Nonbank financial 
institutions’ assets to 
GDP
14.26457 6.34133 24.29674 0.000448 174.427
Financial freedom 4.838321 5 1.976438 1 9
Divergence of reserve 
requirements rates 
based on term
-0.0225039 0 0.0711225 -0.72 0.095
Entry into banking 
requirements (2011 
Survey)
7.708075 8 1.031641 0 8
GDP per capita 9206.248 2535.22 15329.66 69.5792 158603
Macroprudential Index 1.755102 1 1.544939 0 8





 To investigate whether the conjectures put forth in section 3 hold, we carry out two sets 
of estimations, pooling OLS and fixed-effects, based on variants of the following equations: 
???????,? = ????? + ???????? ?????,?? + ???????? ?????,?? ?????. + ??,?   (eq. 4)??????????????,? = ????? + ???????? ?????,? + ???????? ?????,??????. + ??,?   (eq. 5) 
where ?????. stands for the dummy variables described in the previous section. In eq. 4, 
we use the squared policy rate to account for possible short-term price rigidities, but the 
alternative regression considering the policy rate is also shown in the Annex. 
Underlying these econometric specifications is the assumption that policy rate 
movements, ?????? ??????, are not caused by variations in lending spreads, ????????, in bank 
concentration, ???????????????, or by movements in common drivers. The hypothesis on which 
the validity of these regressions hinges is that changes in the policy rate are uncorrelated to the 
drivers of bank concentration and lending spreads with which they do not have a causality link 
starting in the policy rate. Assuming that lending spreads or bank concentration are not targets 




















Financial freedom 0.0313 0.0557 1
GDP per capita 0.2079 -0.2843 0.1733 1
Entry into banking 
requirements (All 
Surveys)
0.1537 0.1437 -0.0569 0.0131 1
Nonbank financial 
institutions’ assets to 
GDP




 In fact, higher policy rates may be a reaction of the monetary authorities to increases in 
macroeconomic risks that are simultaneously but independently factored into the credit spreads. 
Such risks could be diversifiable to large, internationally active banks and, therefore, the more 
diversified portfolio of the biggest banks would render them more efficient. However, this narrative 
needs the assumption of the incompleteness of the financial system, that is, the inexistence of 
financial instruments that would afford small banks protection to a diversifiable risk, an assumption 
that is unlikely to hold in globalized markets. The GFC has shown that even small institutions can 
easily expose themselves to portfolios that bear no connection to their immediate economic 
environment. 
 Another possible narrative for simultaneity bias stems from the literature on financial 
accelerator and credit constraints (see, for instance, BERNANKE, 2007). If an increase in the 
policy rate leads to the devaluation of collaterals, loan spreads must increase to take into account 
the heightened credit risk. Also, if one assumes that smaller firms have higher financial constrains 
in this sense, then their credit availability is affected in a more significant proportion. Finally, if 
smaller credit institutions were specialized in granting loans to smaller firms, then there would be 
an ensuing increase in bank concentration. However, the results on bank concentration are similar 
when reserve requirements rates are used instead of policy rates.  
We regress bank concentration on a measure of the reserve requirements that would 
affect the marginal costs of banks according to their funding base in a manner similar to the policy 
rate. The measure is the difference between the reserve requirements rates of term deposits and 
demand deposits, which is a measure that roughly captures a wedge on the marginal costs of 
banks with a retail funding base and of banks without it. Therefore, the propositions of section 3 
would remain mostly unchanged when such measure is used instead of the policy rate, but the 
link of reserve requirement rates to firm’s financial constraints is tenuous at best. 
 Finally, it could be the case that monetary policy is regularly used in conjunction with 
macroprudential instruments and we are unintentionally observing the effects of the latter. For 
instance, in the event of an overheating of the credit market, it is plausible that policy-makers 
would also introduce prudential requirements, especially after the GFC. Such countercyclical 
introduction of prudential requirements could be cause of the increase of bank concentration if 
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larger banks cope better with their costs, and of the wider spreads if the costs of adhering to 
prudential requirements are incorporated into prices. We rule out this possibility by controlling for 
the introduction of macroprudential requirements, using the Macroprudential Index developed by 
CERUTTI, CLAESSENS, and LAEVEN (2017). 
 In any case, we also test the lag of the policy rate as an instrumental variable, which 
would clean the variation on the policy rate of any other simultaneity bias. 
6. Empirical results 
 We find that the policy rate affects bank concentration, in ways that are compatible with 
proposition 1. As shown by regressions (2) and (7) in tables 4, 5 and 6 below, the effect is primarily 
due to economies in which the banking sector is heavily concentrated (bank concentration is 
above 70%) and is stronger in economies which nonbanks are a relevant part of the credit market.  
The first finding could be interpreted in terms of Proposition 1 if economies with such 
concentrated banking sectors were more likely to have its biggest banks with retail funding or, by 
the same token, if economies with less concentrated banking sectors were more likely to have 
wholesale funded-banks among its biggest banks. The United States is a case in point, for its 
banking sector is relatively fragmented and there is a negative correlation between deposit 
funding and size in the American loan market. 
As for economies in which nonbanks are a relevant part of the credit market, they are the 
markets where business could be diverted towards banks with retail funding at the highest 
intensity, for obvious reasons, since nonbanks by definition do not take deposits. 
 As can be seen in regression (6) in tables 4, 5 and 6 below, the effect is actually reversed 
in economies following inflation targeting regimes. Our theoretical framework is not equipped to 
deal with dynamic effects, but it seems plausible that a more transparent regime will lead to some 
anticipation and better planning on the part of the banks, weakening the short-term effect on 






Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 0.187439 *** -0.721379 *** 0.270088 0.286758 *** 0.184818 *** 0.156780 *** 0.269325 ***
Std. Err. 0.039862 0.265801 0.284359 0.104527 0.042102 0.049772 0.061431
Policy rate*I bank concentration 1.022339 ***
Std. Err. 0.290096
Policy rate*I entry requirements -0.617498
Std. Err. 0.539063
Policy rate*I financial freedom -0.244743 *
Std. Err. 0.130999
Policy rate*I rich country -1.030048
Std. Err. 0.714116
Policy rate*I inflation targeting -1.482007 ***
Std. Err. 0.448502
Policy rate*I nonbanks participation 1.486664 ***
Std. Err. 0.542787
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of groups 78 78 75 58 77 78 32
Average obs per group 12.8 12.8 7.9 13.0 13.0 12.8 10.1
Number of observations 1001 1001 595 756 998 1001 324
Table 4. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation with year dummies, bank concentration
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 0,217483 *** -0,719878 ** 0,459466 0,328172 *** 0,221653 *** 0,183994 *** 0,129060 ***
Std. Err. 0,038847 0,275508 0,313454 0,123593 0,040052 0,034657 0,046675
Policy rate*I bank concentration 1,063344 ***
Std. Err. 0,308190
Policy rate*I entry requirements -0,368524
Std. Err. 0,613860
Policy rate*I financial freedom -0,268929 *
Std. Err. 0,149653
Policy rate*I rich country -0,465095
Std. Err. 0,410992
Policy rate*I inflation targeting -1,432161 ***
Std. Err. 0,486691
Policy rate*I nonbanks participation -0,141800
Std. Err. 0,425677
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Prob > F 0,0000 0,0007 0,3418 0,0257 0,0000 0,0000 0,0326
Number of groups 78 78 75 58 77 78 32
Average obs per group 12,8 12,8 7,9 13,0 13,0 12,8 10,1
Number of observations 1001 1001 595 756 998 1001 324
Table 5. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation without year dummies, bank concentration
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 0.092029 ** -1.431848 *** 0.153834 0.271061 *** 0.100671 ** 0.124456 *** 0.120618 **
Std. Err. 0.040845 0.281054 0.165516 0.073193 0.040918 0.042272 0.056206
Policy rate*I bank concentration 1.908466 ***
Std. Err. 0.286820
Policy rate*I entry requirements -0.347689
Std. Err. 0.234404
Policy rate*I financial freedom -0.335452 ***
Std. Err. 0.114314
Policy rate*I rich country 0.450721
Std. Err. 0.441059
Policy rate*I inflation targeting -1.303447 ***
Std. Err. 0.161169
Policy rate*I nonbanks participation 0.229675
Std. Err. 0.419667
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Prob > F 0.0245 0.0000 0.3084 0.0005 0.0359 0.0000 0.0746
 R-squared 0.0024 0.2661 0.0042 0.0187 0.0036 0.0454 0.0054
Number of observations 1001 1001 595 756 998 1001 324
Table 6. Pooling OLS estimation, bank concentration
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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 We found that the policy rate affects banks’ lending spread in ways that are compatible 
with Proposition 2. As can be seen in regression (3) in tables 7, 8 and 9 below, the effect seems 
to be much stronger in jurisdictions where the entry requirements are more burdensome, thus, 
places where a transition to a strategy of retail funding is likely to carry higher fixed costs. Besides, 
as shown by regression (5) in tables 7, 8 and 9 below, the effect is also more significant in rich 
countries, which probably have a more mature capital market and, thus, a larger number of credit 
granting institution whose funding is obtained at rates highly correlated to the policy rate (a bigger 
?), as explicitly considered in section 3. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 2 0.004159 *** 0.003965 ** 0.001743 *** 0.004385 *** 0.004849 *** 0.004126 *** 0.001319
Std. Err. 0.001361 0.001058 0.000491 0.000822 0.001201 0.001358 0.001967
Policy rate 2 *I bank concentration 0.000293
Std. Err. 0.001012
Policy rate 2 *I entry requirements 0.012279 **
Std. Err. 0.005409
Policy rate 2 *I financial freedom -0.002806
Std. Err. 0.001865
Policy rate 2 *I rich country 0.020568 **
Std. Err. 0.008071
Policy rate 2 *I inflation targeting 0.017714 *
Std. Err. 0.009290
Policy rate 2 *I nonbanks participation 0.001884
Std. Err. 0.005444
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
Number of groups 71 69 64 55 70 71 30
Average obs per group 12.8 10.2 6.9 13.1 12.8 12.8 11.5
Number of observations 910 702 442 720 896 910 344
Table 7. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation with year dummies, bank lending-deposit spread
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 2 0.003950 *** 0.004162 *** 0.001962 *** 0.004736 *** 0.004774 *** 0.003925 *** 0.000839
Std. Err. 0.001440 0.001094 0.000358 0.000985 0.001193 0.001443 0.002636
Policy rate 2 *I bank concentration 0.000357
Std. Err. 0.001004
Policy rate 2 *I entry requirements 0.013075 **
Std. Err. 0.005589
Policy rate 2 *I financial freedom -0.002408
Std. Err. 0.001591
Policy rate 2 *I rich country 0.006566
Std. Err. 0.007130
Policy rate 2 *I inflation targeting 0.022254 ***
Std. Err. 0.008080
Policy rate 2 *I nonbanks participation 0.001189
Std. Err. 0.002654
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Prob > F 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0000
Number of groups 71 69 64 55 70 71 30
Average obs per group 12.8 10.2 6.9 13.1 12.8 12.8 11.5
Number of observations 910 702 442 720 896 910 344
Table 8. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation without year dummies, bank lending-deposit spread
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy rate 2 0.005707 *** 0.010595 *** 0.003097 0.005280 *** 0.006214 *** 0.005679 *** 0.008037 *
Std. Err. 0.000964 0.002192 0.002784 0.001474 0.001103 0.000949 0.004565
Policy rate 2 *I bank concentration -0.006672 ***
Std. Err. 0.002346
Policy rate 2 *I entry requirements 0.048441 ***
Std. Err. 0.009073
Policy rate 2 *I financial freedom -0.001382
Std. Err. 0.001819
Policy rate 2 *I rich country -0.069774 ***
Std. Err. 0.009530
Policy rate 2 *I inflation targeting 0.067510 ***
Std. Err. 0.009985
Policy rate 2 *I nonbanks participation -0.019650 ***
Std. Err. 0.004513
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 R-squared 0.1501 0.1559 0.2535 0.0729 0.1791 0.3070 0.0481
Number of observations 910 702 442 720 896 910 344
Table 9. Pooling OLS estimation, bank lending-deposit spread
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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 As we ponder the robustness of the results we found, we estimate a fixed-effects 
regression of bank concentration on the difference between the reserve requirements rates of 
term deposits and demand deposits. Increases in such difference alter the relative efficiency of 
demand deposits, the quintessential form of retail funding, to the advantage of banks with retail 
funding strategies. However, as not all credit granting entities can take deposits, whether term 
deposits or demand deposits, the effects are not expected to be the same as that in the case of 
the policy rate being considered. For instance, an overall increase in reserve requirements may 
cause all banks to lose market share to other credit-granting entities such as funds that do not 
need to hold such mandatory reserves. Therefore, Proposition 1 may not fully apply. In any event, 
controlling for the average reserve requirement4, an increase in the difference of the reserve 
requirement rate applicable to term deposits to that applicable to demand deposits does increase 
bank concentration, as shown in table 10 below. 
                                                          
4
 Average in terms of the different types of deposits, not weighted by volume. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Avg. RR 17.392520 20.087940 -2.629590 19.200970 19.009820 16.552960 15.865570
Std. Err. 19.815120 19.990060 9.164372 22.493440 20.221200 20.226790 24.773800
Div. RR 44.152410 *** 50.005810 *** 246.236400 *** 42.109090 *** 43.181840 *** 45.408830 *** 34.717200 **
Std. Err. 11.619720 11.025690 71.999270 10.721590 11.901440 9.401673 13.529130
Div. RR*I bank concentration -115.336700 ***
Std. Err. 41.231440
Div. RR*I entry requirements -166.332000 *
Std. Err. 92.486750
Div. RR*I financial freedom -49.853760
Std. Err. 34.329200
Div. RR*I rich country 199.842900
Std. Err. 175.531700
Div. RR*I inflation targeting 9.849455
Std. Err. 20.581960
Div. RR*I nonbanks participation 6626.896000 *
Std. Err. 3684.807000
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
Number of groups 76 76 74 55 75 76 34
Average obs per group 15.8 15.8 9.1 16.5 15.8 15.8 12.4
Number of observations 1199 1199 676 906 1184 1199 421
Table 10. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation, bank concentration
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Robust Std. Errors
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 Table 11 below displays the results when the lag of the policy rate is used as an 
instrument in a fixed-effects regression with year dummies. When compared to the same 
regression without the use of the instrumental variable, the results appear to be stronger.  
 
 
Variable Bank concentration bank lending-deposit spread
Policy rate 0.749588 ***
Std. Err. 0.137242
Policy rate 2 0.007071 ***
Std. Err. 0.0005818
Constant YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Number of groups 78 69
Average obs per group 12.2 12.2
Number of observations 948 841
Table 11. Fixed-effects (within) IV regression with year dummies
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Std. Errors
Econometric specification Bank concentration Bank lending-deposit spread
Policy rate 0.145645 ***
Std. Err. 0.0360092
Policy rate 2 0.004310 ***
Std. Err. 0.0004611
Macroprudential Index -1.149859 0.339588
Std. Err. 1.442161 0.2484493
Constant YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000
Number of groups 67 58
Average obs per group 11.3 9.8
Number of observations 754 568
Table 12. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation with year dummies
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%;  Robust Std. Errors
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Finally, table 12 above shows the result when we add the Macroprudential Index as a 
control for simultaneous policies of that nature. Again, the results remain significant. 
7. Bank-level results 
  Using data from BANKSCOPE, we investigate whether our reasoning holds at a bank-
level panel. We restrict our sample to commercial banks. It has over a hundred thousand bank-
year observations spanning the years 1997-2014 in 54 countries. Based on this sample, we see 
how net loan growth of each bank is affected by variations in the policy rate. The impact of the 
policy rate is significantly smaller for the largest banks and for deposit-funded banks, as shown 
in table 13 below. However, this divergence may not appear in every sample, since it depends on 
country characteristics, as discussed in the previous section. For that end, the Appendix contains 
tables showing the impact of the United States, the jurisdiction most represented in the sample 
by far and one whose banking sector has distinct characteristics. 
 The basic equation estimated by fixed effects is: 
??? ???? ?????ℎ?,? = ????? + ??∆?????? ?????,? + ??∆?????? ?????,???+??∆?????? ?????,???% ???? ?????? ?????,? ?? ??? + ??∆?????? ?????,?????% ???? ?????? ?????,? ?? ???+??∆?????? ?????,???????? ????????,? + ???∆?????? ?????,?????????? ????????,?+???????????? ??????,??? + ????????? ??????,??? + ???????,??? + ???????? + ??,?   (eq. 6) 
where ??% ?.  ?????,? ?? ??? stands for the dummy variables that flashes whenever the bank had a 
market share of over 5% in the previous period. We characterize deposit funding as the relative 
importance of customer deposits for the bank funding, measured as a proportion of total liabilities. 
The liquidity index is a straightforward proportion of liquid assets to total assets, while the equity 
index is similarly defined as equity to total assets. The ROE is calculated as the net income over 
equity. We also include controls to reflect macroeconomic conditions, the GDP growth and the 




 The takeaway from the bank-level estimation is that after controlling for the equity and 
liquidity indexes, the effects of the policy rate on net loans growth is subdued in proportion to the 
relative importance of customer deposits for the bank funding, as seen in regression (2) in table 
13 above. That is the empirical expression of the gist of our theoretical model. Everything else 
involving our conjectures follows from this finding. The other result, that the biggest banks are 
less affected, is a mere confirmation of the country-level finding that higher policy rates increase 
bank concentration. 
Variable (1) (2)
ΔPolicy rate -0.099634 ** -0.198551 ***
Std. Err. 0.044427 0.040221
ΔPolicy rate*I mkt share on loans 5%, past year 0.108873 **
Std. Err. 0.043829
ΔPolicy rate*(Total Customer Deposits/Total Assets) 0.225005 ***
Std. Err. 0.067141
Lagged  ΔPolicy rate -0.043164 ** -0.005424
Std. Err. 0.017926 0.028654
Lagged ΔPolicy rate*I mkt share on loans 5%, past year 0.055133 **
Std. Err. 0.021497
Lagged ΔPolicy rate*(Total Customer Deposits/Total Assets) -0.030883
Std. Err. 0.049290
GDP growth 0.480816 0.596862
Std. Err. 0.450894 0.357081
Stock market return -0.000616 0.000574
Std. Err. 0.002731 0.001887
Lagged equity index (Equity/Total Assets) 5.480610 *** 5.587434 **
Std. Err. 2.036366 2.154327
Lagged liquidity Index (Liquid Assets/Total Assets) 3.676212 * 3.684257 *
Std. Err. 2.021984 2.050898
Lagged ROE -0.041178 -0.040675
Std. Err. 0.028802 0.028785
Constant YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000
Number of groups 11411 11355
Average obs per group 9.8 9.8
Number of observations 111583 111177
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Cluster by Country Std. Errors (54 Countries)




 We have investigated whether a theoretical possibility that monetary policy affects banks’ 
competitive behavior, as laid out in a simple model, is compatible with the empirical evidence. 
With the use of an extensive cross-country data set spanning over a decade, we argue that the 
results of the theoretical propositions can be employed to explain the empirical findings that the 
monetary policy rate has a positive relationship with both bank concentration and the lending-
deposit spread. 
 Banks are assumed to have different strategies regarding funding bases. Acquiring a 
retail funding base implies high fixed costs, but allows banks to have a deposit funding less 
sensitive to the policy rate. On the other hand, market-based funding is more easily obtainable, 
but is more sensitive to the policy rate. Therefore, when the policy rate increase, banks with a 
retail funding strategy gain an advantage. However, the fact that such a strategy has significant 
barriers to entry means that retail banks are in a more secure position in a high policy rate 
environment. 
 Following this reasoning, we argue that bank concentration increases when the biggest 
banks are retail funded, something that occurs in most countries. As retail funded banks become 
relatively more efficient in a high policy rate environment, they stand to get a larger market share 
at the expense of other entities with market-based funding, whose less aggressive behavior also 
allows retail banks to charge wider spreads unmolested. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The outputs are given by: 
?? = ? − ? ∗ (? − ??) ∗ ?? − ????2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1)?   (eq. 1a) 
?? = ? − ? ∗ (??) ∗ ?? − ????2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − 1 − ??)?   (eq. 2a) 
Combining equations 1a and 2a above: 
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?? = ? − ? ∗ (? − ??) ∗ (? − ???)?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − 1 − ??)? − ????2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1) − ?? ∗ (??) ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − 1 − ??)??
  (eq. 3a) 
Differentiating equation 3a concerning ????: 
???????? =
? ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − 1 − ??)? ∗ ?? − ???2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1) − ?? ∗ (??) ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − 1 − ??)??
  (eq. 4a) 
A sufficient condition for the denominator of equation 4a to be positive is 2 ∗ ? > ?, that is the 
demand at the bank-level is at least as sensitive to the individual output when compared to the 
aggregate output, which is taken as an uncontroversial assumption, and the numerator is non-
negative if: 
2 ∗ ? + ?? ∗ (? − ??) + 1 ≤ ????   (eq. 5a) 
As for ??, both the increase in ?? and the increase in ??? lead to its decrease. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The derivative of the price charged by retail-funded banks is given by: 
???(?? , ??)????? = −?? + ? ∗ (?? − 1)? ∗ ???????? − ? ∗ (? − ??) ∗ ????????   (eq. 1b)  
The derivative of the output of a retail funded-bank concerning the policy rate is outlined in 
equation 4a, while the same procedure obtains the derivative of the output of market funded-
banks concerning the policy rate: 
?? = ?1 − ? ∗ ???2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1)?? ∗ ? + ? ? ∗ ??2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1)? ∗ ??? − ????2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − ?? − 1) − ?? ∗ ?? ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (?? − 1)??




? ∗ ???2 ∗ ?? + ? ∗ ???? − 1?? ∗ ?? − ??
??
?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − ?? − 1) − ?? ∗ ??? ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ?? + ? ∗ ???? − 1?????
?  (eq. 3b) 
Combining equations 1b, 4a, and 3b yields: 






? ? ∗ ?1 − ??? ??2 ∗ ? − ?? + ? ∗ ?1 − ??? ????
? ∗ ?? − ??
??






− ? ∗ (? − ??) ∗
??
???
? ∗ ???2 ∗ ? − ?? + ? ∗ ??? ∗ ?? − ??
?2 ∗ ? + ? ∗ (? − ?? − 1) − ?? ∗ ??? ∗ (? − ??)?2 ∗ ? − ?? + ? ∗ ??? ???
???
?    (eq. 4b) 
 
If we assume that ? is sufficiently large so that ?∗????  is approximately zero, then equation 4b can 
be simplified to: 
(? ∗ (? + 1 − 2 ∗ ??) − ?) ∗ ? ?? − ??2 ∗ ? − ??   (eq. 5b) 
Therefore ???(??,??)????? > 1 is equivalent to: 
? − 2 ∗ ?? > 1? ∗ ?2 ∗ ? − ??? − ?? + ?? − 1  (eq. 6b) 
Alternative regression: 
In table 14 below, we present the results on bank lending deposit spread considering the policy 





Impact of the United States on bank-level results: 
In table 15 below, we exclude the American banks from the sample. We do that because of their 
weight, encompassing the majority of the observations. By excluding them we make sure that the 
results are not due to a quirk in that particular market. In that subsample, we still find that loan 
concentration increases in the same way and that deposit-funded banks are less affected by 
monetary policy.  
Econometric specification OLS Fixed-effects Fixed-effects
Policy rate 0.355689 *** 0.222803 ** 0.258660 **
Std. Err. 0.0477051 0.1006247 0.1008552
Constant YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO YES
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0301 0.0000
R-squared 0.2037 - -
Number of groups - 71 71
Average obs per group - 12.8 12.8
Number of observations 910 910 910
Table 14. Results on bank-lending deposit spread







ΔPolicy rate -0.077946 ** -0.186554 ***
Std. Err. 0.036799 0.036100
ΔPolicy rate*I mkt share on loans 5%, past year 0.095061 **
Std. Err. 0.042543
ΔPolicy rate*(Total Customer Deposits/Total Assets) 0.270365 ***
Std. Err. 0.071379
Lagged  ΔPolicy rate -0.026858 * -0.025557
Std. Err. 0.013694 0.030229
Lagged ΔPolicy rate*I mkt share on loans 5%, past year 0.042857 **
Std. Err. 0.020466
Lagged ΔPolicy rate*(Total Customer Deposits/Total Assets) 0.044261
Std. Err. 0.049687
GDP growth 1.535122 ** 1.422847 ***
Std. Err. 0.692829 0.495869
Stock market return -0.003498 -0.002872
Std. Err. 0.003657 0.003231
Lagged equity index (Equity/Total Assets) 7.446498 * 7.989279 **
Std. Err. 4.254567 4.817153
Lagged liquidity Index (Liquid Assets/Total Assets) 7.631167 * 7.946259 *
Std. Err. 4.400580 4.624105
Lagged ROE -0.078559 * -0.076424 *
Std. Err. 0.040912 0.040310
Constant YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000
Number of groups 2408 2354
Average obs per group 5.2 5.2
Number of observations 12608 12219
Table 15. Fixed-effects panel-data estimation with year dummies, net loans growth, excluding American banks
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; Cluster by Country Std. Errors (53 Countries)
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Chapter 2 – Prudential regulation and bank competition: a model for various regimes  
 
1. Introduction 
 Using the model with borrower moral hazard developed by ARPING (2017), we conclude 
that capital requirements do not always reduce risk-taking. In fact, only in a monopoly or a near-
monopoly does the exogenous capital requirement improve loan quality. For the other cases, the 
capital requirement causes higher loan rates, thus, it negatively affects borrower incentives. As 
banks substitute risk-insensitive insured deposits for equity, their cost inevitably rises and so does 
the loan rate. Similarly, capital requirements do not alleviate the effects of deposit competition on 
risk-taking under all regimes and may actually aggravate them. Last but not least, the degree of 
competition in the loan market affects the efficacy of capital requirements on curbing risk-taking 
in a monopoly. 
Although it is often assumed that capital requirements improve financial stability, the 
theoretical literature does not provide a clear-cut answer (VANHOOSE, 2007). In fact, while 
capital requirements provide a cushion against losses, they may incentivize risk-taking, thus, 
making such losses more likely and muddling the final picture. Given that risk-taking is intimately 
linked to competition, as many have argued (see VIVES, 2016, for an extensive review), it is only 
natural that the effects of capital requirements on risk-taking should be assessed against a 
backdrop of various competition regimes. 
As for the other prudential requirement considered in this work, the liquidity requirement, 
the conclusions are also nuanced. Liquidity requirements can either increase or decrease bank 
risk-taking depending on the market structure. It goes without saying that liquidity requirements 
exist for reasons the model is not capable of grasping, but it should be noted that liquidity 
requirements always increase the effect of deposit competition on bank risk-taking in loan 
markets, a finding that might be relevant for policy making. 
Several authors have dealt with the issue of how competition affects risk taking in 
banking. Some, such as KEELEY (1990), have argued that competition erodes banks’ long-term 
profits, that is, the charter value of banking, making the prospect of failure less unsavory to 
bankers. Others, following BOYD and DE NICOLÓ (2005), point out that borrower incentives are 
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such that the higher lending rates associated with less competition entails greater moral hazard. 
In other words, facing high lending rates, it is the borrower that may not care as much if his project 
fails and the loan is defaulted upon. Reconciling both views, we argue that ultimately the relation 
between bank competition and financial stability hinges on which decision is given more weight 
to and that, in turn, is something determined by the market structure. It is on this insight, developed 
in the seminal paper of ARPING (2017), that we build our work. 
In the model designed by ARPING (2017) that we build upon, the competition in the loan 
market can follow three regimes: monopoly, perfect competition and imperfect competition. In a 
monopoly, the banker has the liberty to set loan rates taking into consideration the borrowers’ 
decision making, while under a perfect competition regime, the banker is constrained to maximize 
borrower utility. Therefore, contingent on the market structure, the perspective of a different agent 
will prevail. We use this framework to understand how prudential requirements fare in the three 
regimes of competition in the loan market and how prudential requirements affect the way through 
which the degree of competition in the deposit market influences risk-taking. 
 This chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature, presenting a brief review of the previous work on understanding the impact of prudential 
requirements. In section 3, we lay out the theoretical model and the aforementioned results. 
Section 4, the conclusion, ends the chapter. 
2. Literature review 
This work is primarily connected to the literature that seeks to understand the impact of 
prudential regulation on bank’s decision making. This literature is relatively ample when capital 
requirements are concerned, but almost inexistent in the case of liquidity requirements (ALLEN 
et al., 2014).  However, this fact does not imply universally established conclusions regarding the 
effects of capital requirements. On the contrary, VANHOOSE (2007) reviews the theoretical 
literature on bank behavior under capital regulation and finds that it produces mixed predictions 
on the effects of capital requirements on risk-taking. Similarly, there is relatively little empirical 
literature on estimating the overall net impact of capital requirements (DIAMOND and KASHYAP, 
2016), and the effect on risk-taking seems to either small or non-existent, a finding that may be 
explained in several ways. 
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CALEM and ROB (1999) calibrate a portfolio choice problem and find a U-shaped 
relationship between capital and risk-taking. Their result that risk-taking first declines and then 
increases may account for the small aggregate impact found by RIME (2001). Another possible 
explanation may be that, as MILNE (2002) discussed, the effects of capital regulation bear relation 
to the ex post penalties for breaching the minimum requirements and not necessarily the level of 
such requirements. Finally, our result may also contribute to this debate, as different banks may 
be exposed to diverse niches even if in the same jurisdiction and, therefore, several distinct 
competitive environments may coexist, generating opposite effects that can cancel each other 
out in country-level studies. Under this reasoning, the consolidated impact is expected to be small 
or non-existent. 
This work is also linked to the literature that explicitly considers competition regimes to 
assess the impact of capital regulation on risk-taking. REPULLO (2004) and HELLMANN et al. 
(2000) build on a model of spatial monopolistic competition and find that capital regulation 
improves the banks’ operating margin, thus, enhancing the incentive to be prudent, for the banker 
will have more of its wealth at stake. Our result also conveys aspects of this logic, but we find it 
to be conditional on the market structure, for in a perfectly competitive loan market or near-
perfectly competitive loan market, banks’ margins are not sensitive to capital requirements once 
the opportunity cost of equity is taken into account.  
In a way, our work is also close to that of SCHLIEPHAKE (2016), since it analyzes the 
interferences of the competitive environment on the effects of capital regulation and concludes 
that the optimal level of capital requirements may depend on the market structure. She assumes 
that capital requirements change the competitive environment by negatively affecting entry and 
increasing the market power of incumbents. On the other hand, we take the market structure as 
a given and show that capital requirements have an ambiguous effect on stability precisely 
because bank competition differs ex-ante, a completely different foundation for a similar 
conclusion that intense competition may reverse the stability-enhancing effect of capital 
requirements5. 
                                                          
5
 CHEN (2016) shows that credit market competition reduces banks’ incentive to hold capital, but this conclusion is not 
related to ours, since we restrict our attention to capital requirements only. For a general review of reasons why banks 
hold excess capital see TABAK, NORONHA, and CAJUEIRO (2011). 
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3. The model 
 The structure of the model is that developed by ARPING (2017). The model is suited to 
analyze the impact of prudential policies under divergent scenarios concerning bank competition 
because it allows them to be integrated in a single comparable framework that also considers 
varying degrees of competition in the deposit market. The setting is a two-period economy in 
which two bankers, bank 1 and bank 2, compete over a single loan extended to an entrepreneur 
that faces a cost ? to switch from bank 1 to bank 2. When ? = ∞, bank 1 enjoys a monopoly, while 
? = 0 implies perfect competition à la Bertrand. Naturally, ? > 0 accommodates the remaining 
intermediate cases that are referred to as imperfect competition. 
 The banks also compete for deposits. There are two of continua of families, each 
endowed with $1 that can either be taken to a riskless money market, in which the return is 
normalized to 1, or be deposited in a bank. Families only value consumption in the second period 
? = 1 and have no storing technology. Each bank has access to a separate continuum of families 
of a single unit of mass, which we refer to as the “local” deposit market. Families in the local 
deposit market 1 (2) find it more convenient to deposit their endowments in bank 1 (2), for 
otherwise they must incur in a cost ?? > 0. Thus, ?? is a measure of the degree of competition in 
the deposit market, for it conveys the spread banks can earn by simply taking deposits and 
investing them in the riskless money market. Banks cannot differentiate prices between the two 
continua of families. 
The families are indifferent between obtaining a return of 1 in the money market and 
depositing their endowment in their respective local bank for a return of 1 − ??, as the deposits 
are fully insured. In addition, we assume that banks have a capacity constraint so that a bank 
cannot corner the deposit market by receiving all deposits from both continua of families. Under 
that assumption, the equilibrium in the deposit market is attained by each bank offering a return 
of 1 − ?? to its local depositors. If a bank offers a return high enough to attract entire deposit 
market, it will reach its capacity constraint and would be worse off, alternatively, if it offers a lower 
return, the families in its local market would take their endowments to the money market, also 
leaving the bank worse off. 
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The entrepreneur does not have access to sources of funding other than the bank loan 
to develop his project. His project generates Π > 1 if it succeeds, but yields nothing otherwise. 
The probability that the project succeeds is given by the unobservable effort ? of the entrepreneur, 
who incurs in a private cost ?(?) ≡ ???/2 to exert effort ?. As the bank charges ? for the loan, 
the utility of the risk-neutral entrepreneur is given by ?? = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?).  Therefore, the model 
displays borrower moral hazard. Naturally, we assume the conditions for the existence of a level 
of effort such that the net expected return of the project enables it to be brought about and all 
results we discuss are restricted to the instances in which that occurs. Thus, we do not discuss 
output levels in this work.  
 We introduce a capital requirement as the exogenous percentage ? of the loan that must 
be funded with the banker’s own equity. We assume that the banker has enough equity to face 
this requirement but otherwise would not be interested in funding the entrepreneur with its own 
resources, since it costs more to do so. The banker is risk-neutral and includes the opportunity 
cost of capital in its utility. In other words, the banker considers that his equity must have the 
same expected return of the risk-less financial market, as otherwise the banker would rather leave 
the business. Thus, the utility of the banker is given by ?? ≡ ?(? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ? when the 
capital requirement is introduced.  
We also consider a liquidity requirement ?. For each $1 extended as a loan to the 
entrepreneur, the banker must set aside ? to fund a liquidity reserve. In this scenario, the local 
market for deposits is assumed to have enough endowments to provide the additional resources 
needed by the bank. Accordingly, the utility of the banker would then be ?? ≡?(? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)), since the liquidity reserve is held in the money market and yields 1.  
3.1 Monopoly 
Assuming ? = ∞, bank 1 has a monopoly in the loan market. Under such circumstances, 
bank 1 can safely ignore the existence of bank 2, and maximize his utility when setting ? and the 
equilibrium effort level ? it entails given the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint. As the outside 
option of the entrepreneur is the exclusion from the market, the only individual rationality (IR) 
constraint is that his utility is bigger or equal to zero. 
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???(?, ?) ??  s.t.??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?) ≥ 0 (IR)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
Proposition 1.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the exogenous capital requirement increases 
the effort level ? and reduces the loan rate ?, the intensity of the effects is negatively affected by 
??. 
The most puzzling aspect of proposition 1 is its second part, that is, ?? negatively affecting 
the impact of the capital requirement on risk-taking. However, it should be noted that the capital 
requirement is similar, in its effects on risk-taking, to less competition in the deposit market. The 
higher the ??, the more the funding from depositors resembles the banker’s equity in determining 
the risk level. Thus, capital requirements do not make much of a difference at high levels of ??. 
In fact, at the limit, ?? = 1, the depositors’ funding is indistinguishable from equity, since, in effect, 
it is irrevocably given to the banker, and the capital requirement is therefore without effects. As 
for the effect on effort and on the loan rate, it follows from the fact that the bank becomes more 
sensitive to losses and a lower loan rate reduces losses. 
Proposition 2.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the exogenous liquidity requirement increases 
the effort level ? and decreases the loan rate ?, the intensity of the effects is positively affected 
by ??. 
 The intuition to proposition 2 is akin to that of proposition 1. The liquidity requirement 
enables the bank to obtain a higher rent from its position in the deposit market. Thus, in this 
particular sense, the liquidity requirement increases the franchise value of the bank. However, as 
this increase in the franchise value of the bank is proportional to ??, it is only natural that the 
intensity of the effect of the liquidity requirement depends on ??.  
Proposition 3.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the effect of the degree of competition in the 
deposit market on the effort level is reduced by the capital requirement but increased by the 
liquidity requirement. 
 Proposition 3 is fairly straightforward. The capital requirement reduces the exposure of 
the bank to the deposit market, thus, it reduces the impact the deposit market competition has on 
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risk-taking. On the other hand, the liquidity requirement does exactly the opposite. The higher the 
liquidity requirement the more important the deposit market becomes for the bank. 
3.2 Perfect competition 
Assuming ? = 0, the entrepreneur’s decision is based only on the loan rate ?. As banks 
quote their offers simultaneously in ? = 0, they compete à la Bertrand. For the mere sake of 
completeness, we assume that facing equal prices, the entrepreneur strictly prefers bank 1’s offer. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, the utility of the entrepreneur is maximized subject to the constraint that 
banker 1 opts to take part in the arrangement, but has no economic profit (ZP) from extending the 
loan.  
When the bank is subject to a capital requirement, the equilibrium is given by the solution 
to the following program: 
???(?, ?) ??  s.t.?(? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ? − ??(1 − ?) = 0 (??)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
Similarly, if there is an exogenous liquidity requirement, the program becomes: 
???(?, ?) ??  s.t.?(? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)) − (1 + ?)?? = 0 (??)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
Proposition 4.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the exogenous capital requirement 
decreases the effort level ? and increases the loan rate ?. 
Proposition 5.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the exogenous liquidity requirement 
decreases the effort level ? and increases the loan rate ?.  
Propositions 4 and 5 tell the same story. The prudential requirement increases how much 
of the total surplus must be set aside to compensate the banker, which does not make any profit 
but must not suffer any economic loss in equilibrium. Thus, this dent in the utility of the 
entrepreneur negatively affects his incentive to exert effort. In a nutshell, the increased cost of 
funding is passed along to the entrepreneur, increasing moral hazard. 
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Proposition 6.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the effect of the degree of competition in 
the deposit market on the effort level is increased by both the liquidity requirement and the capital 
requirement. 
 Proposition 6 is not surprising when the liquidity requirement is considered, as it increases 
the amount of bank funding subject to the influence of the deposit market. However, even though 
the capital requirement does exactly the opposite it has an indirect effect on the equilibrium effort 
that predominates over this direct effect. At the same time that the surplus the entrepreneur has 
to set aside to the banker because of this position in deposit market shrinks because of the capital 
requirement, it also causes the total surplus attributable to the bank to increase, which worsens 
incentives. With less effort, the surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur and the banker is 
smaller, and therefore, the entrepreneur is more sensitive to any additional amount of utility it 
loses to the bank, which is precisely the consequence of less competition in the deposit market.  
3.3 Imperfect competition 
Assuming ? > 0, bank 1 takes into consideration that the entrepreneur could opt to take 
the loan with bank 2 when deciding which loan rate to offer. Therefore, bank 1 now faces two 
individual rationality constraints, as the entrepreneur has two outside options to ponder. In 
addition to individual rationality constraint already mentioned, bank 1 has to offer a rate that the 
entrepreneur prefers over that of bank 2 (IR’’), which is given by ?∗, ?∗ in the program below. 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?)  s.t.??(?, ?) = ???(?) − ?(?)  ≥ ??(?∗, ?∗) = ?∗??(?∗) − ?(?∗) − ? (??")??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?)  ≥ 0 (???)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
It should be noted that, in equilibrium, the only possible values for ?∗ and ?∗ are those 
that bank 2 would offer under perfect competition. Were they to assume any other value, bank 1 
could easily undercut bank 2 of any additional utility its offer could possibly generate. Therefore, 
these are only values that could be part of a strategic equilibrium in imperfect competition, and 
the entrepreneur anticipates that before reaching out to bank 2 and igniting a bidding war. 
Proposition 7.  In an imperfectly competitive loan market, propositions 4, 5 and 6 still apply. 
However, for a sufficiently large ?, propositions 1, 2 and 3 apply instead. 
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 Proposition 7 simply says that the threshold between the polar cases we discussed is 
well-behaved. However, it has important policy implications, since the results we found for a 
monopoly could apply to market structures with more than a one bank. In fact, propositions 1, 2 
and 3 depend only on a sufficiently large switching cost. 
4. Conclusion 
 Our work has shown that it is not possible to reach unconditional results regarding the 
impact of prudential requirements on the banking activity. In particular, results vary widely 
depending on the market structure and on the type of the prudential regulation. Even in a relatively 
simple model such as ARPING’s (2017), one can easily reach opposite conclusions regarding the 
effect of capital or liquidity requirements on bank risk-taking and loan rates or on the relationship 
between deposit competition and risk-taking. Therefore, our work is an attestation to the relevance 
of considering the market structure when assessing the implementation of prudential regulations. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the exogenous capital requirement 
increases the effort level ? and reduces the loan rate ?, the intensity of the effects is negatively 
affected by ??. 
The program is given by: 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?, ?) = ?(? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ?  s.t.??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?) ≥ 0 (IR)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
However, we know that the IR constraint is not binding. Were it the case, the entrepreneur would 
not choose a positive effort. Therefore, we can safely ignore the IR constraint and find a solution 
considering only the IC constraint. 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?, ?) = ?(? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ?  s.t???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)  
Combining the IC and ??: 
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?(Π − ??(?) − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ? 
Differentiating the expression above with respect to ?, we find the first-order condition below: 
(Π − ??(?) − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ????(?) = 0 (eq. 1) 
Solving for ? and substituting ?(?): 
??? = Π − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)2?  (eq. 2) 
Equation 2 gives the level of effort in a monopoly in the loan market when there is an 
exogenous capital requirement, ???. Differentiating with respect to ? yields: 
?????? = (1 − ??)2? > 0 (eq. 3) 
 
Therefore, the effort exerted by the entrepreneur is increasing in the exogenous capital 
requirement. However, this effect is decreasing in ??. As for the loan rate, it is implicitly defined 
by the IC constraint: 
Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 → ? = ? − ?? (eq. 4) 
Thus, as there is inverse linear relationship between the loan rate and the effort level, the loan 
rate is decreasing in ?. 
Proof of Proposition 2.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the exogenous liquidity requirement 
increases the effort level ? and decreases the loan rate ?, the intensity of the effects is positively 
affected by ??. 
The program is given by: 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?, ?) = ?(? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?))  s.t.??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?) ≥ 0 (IR)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
Following the same steps of the previous proof, we find: 
??? = Π + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)2? (eq. 5) 
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Differentiating with respect to ? yields: 
?????? = ??2? > 0 (eq. 6) 
Proof of Proposition 3.  In a monopoly in the loan market, the effect of the degree of competition 
in the deposit market on the effort level is reduced by the capital requirement but increased by 
the liquidity requirement. 
Differentiating equation 2 with respect to ?? yields: 
??????? = (1 − ?)2? (eq. 7)  
Therefore, even though an increase in the level of competition in the deposit market reduces 
effort, the capital requirement softens that relationship. 
Similarly, differentiating equation 5 with respect to ?? yields: 
??????? = (1 + ?)2? (eq. 8) 
Consequently, we reach the opposite conclusion regarding the liquidity requirement. 
Proof of Proposition 4.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the exogenous capital 
requirement decreases the effort level ? and increases the loan rate ?. 
The program is given by: 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?)  s.t.?(? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ? − ??(1 − ?) = 0 (??)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
Since both constraints are binding, we face a two-equation system whose solutions are given by 
the roots of the following equation: 
?(Π − ?? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)) − ? − ??(1 − ?) = 0 (eq. 9) 
Implicitly differentiating equation 9 with respect to the capital requirement, we find: 
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?????? = (1 − ??)(1 − ???)(Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?))  (eq. 10) 
As ??? ∈ (0,1?, we know that the numerator is a positive number. To find whether the denominator 
is also a positive number, we follow ARPING (2017) and consider a slightly different program that 
is given in terms of the joint surplus of the entrepreneur and the bank, ?(?),  and in which the IC 
constraint incorporates the ZP constraint and the resulting combined constraint is multiplied by 
the effort ?. 
?(?) ≡ ????, ?(?)? + ??(?, ?(?), ?) = ?Π − ?(?) − ?(1 − ??)(1 − ?) (eq. 11) 
The ZP constraint implies ??(?, ?(?), ?) = ? + ??(1 − ?), thus: 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?) = ?(?) − ? − ??(1 − ?) = ?Π − ?(?) − ?(1 − ??)(1 − ?) − ? − ??(1 − ?)  s.t.?(?) ≡ ?Π − ? − ??(1 − ?) − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)? − ???(?) = 0  
In an unconstrained program, we know that ?′(?) = 0, thus: 
??′(?) = ?Π − ??′(?) − ?(1 − ??)(1 − ?) = 0 (eq. 12) 
However, at the optimum of the constrained program, ?∗, we have: 
?∗?′(?∗) = ?(?∗) + ? + ??(1 − ?) = ? + ??(1 − ?) > 0 (eq. 13) 
Consequently, by the concavity of ?(?), the equilibrium effort ?∗ is strictly inferior to the 
unconstrained optimum. Thus, the equilibrium effort is given by the largest solution of the 
program, thus, ?(?) = 0 and: 
?′(???) = Π − (1 − ??)(1 − ?) − 2???? < 0 
Which means that the denominator of equation 10 is negative and therefore the derivative of the 
equilibrium effort with respect to the capital requirement is also negative. 
Proof of Proposition 5.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the exogenous liquidity 
requirement decreases the effort level ? and increases the loan rate ?.  
The proof of proposition 5 closely follows that of proposition 4, but the program is given by: 
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???(?, ?) ??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?)  s.t.?(? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)) − (1 + ?)?? = 0 (??)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
By implicitly differentiating the combined constraints, we obtain: 
?????? = (1 − ???)??(Π − 2???? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)) (eq. 14) 
Finding the sign of the denominator requires the same reasoning as before, from which we can 
conclude that it is negative, as shown below. 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?) = ?(?) − (1 + ?)?? = ?Π − ?(?) + ?? − ?(1 − ??)(1 + ?) − (1 + ?)??  s.t.?(?) ≡ ?Π + ?? − ??(1 + ?) − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)? − ???(?) = 0  
Again, we know that the optimum in an unconstrained program implies ?′(?)=0, thus, 
???(?) = ?Π − ???(?) + ?? − ?(1 − ??)(1 + ?) = 0 (eq. 15) 
However, at the optimum of the constrained program, ?∗, we have: 
?∗?′(?∗) = ?(?∗) + ??(1 + ?) = ??(1 + ?) > 0 (eq. 16) 
Which implies ??(???) < 0, then: 
Π + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)??? − 2???? < 0 
Proof of Proposition 6.  In a perfectly competitive loan market, the effect of the degree of 
competition in the deposit market on the effort level is increased by the liquidity requirement and 
the capital requirement. 
By implicitly differentiating equation 9 with respect to ??: 
??????? = (1 − ???)(1 − ?)Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?) < 0 
It is straightforward that ? decreases the numerator and increases the denominator, but we need 
to further differentiate the expression with respect to ? to find a precise answer on how ????/??? 




?Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)? ???? − 1 − (1 − ?) ?????? ? + ?2? ?????? − (1 − ??)? (1 − ???)(1 − ?)?Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)??  
(eq. 17) 
Equation 17 can be simplified in different ways, for instance, tackling the first expression in the 
numerator: 
?Π − 2?? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)? ?? − 1 − (1 − ?) ?????? ? = −(1 − ?)(Π − 2??) = (1 − ?)(2?? − Π)
< 0 
Since,  
Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?) < 0 → 2???? > Π − (1 − ??)(1 − ?) 
2???? − Π < −(1 − ??)(1 − ?) < 0 
While the second expression in the numerator can be similarly simplified: 
?2? ?????? − (1 − ??)? (1 − ???)(1 − ?)
= ? 2? + (1 − ??)(1 − ?) − Π?Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?)?? (1 − ???)(1 − ?)(1 − ??) < 0 
Since,  
Π − 2???? − (1 − ??)(1 − ?) < 0 → 2? + (1 − ??)(1 − ?) − Π > 0  
Therefore, we can conclude that ????????? < 0. 
Differentiating equation 14 with respect to ??: 
????????? = ?Π − 2???? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?)? ?1 − ??? −




By knowing that Π − 2???? + ? − (1 − ??)(1 + ?) < 0 and that ????/??? < 0, we can conclude 
that equation 18 is negative. 
As ????/??? < 0, it becomes more negative with both ? and ?. 
Proof of Proposition 7.  In an imperfectly competitive loan market, propositions 4, 5 and 6 still 
apply. However, for a sufficiently large ?, propositions 1, 2 and 3 apply instead. 
The problem of solving the program below can be divided in two cases. 
???(?, ?) ??(?, ?)  s.t.??(?, ?) = ???(?) − ?(?)  ≥ ??(?∗, ?∗) = ?∗??(?∗) − ?(?∗) − ? (??")??(?, ?) = ?(Π − ?) − ?(?)  ≥ 0 (???)???(?, ?)?? = Π − ? − ??(?) = 0 (IC)
 
For a sufficiently large ?, the IR’’ constraint is not binding and can be assumed away. In this case, 
the program becomes that of a monopoly. Therefore, propositions 1, 2 and 3 are valid if ? is large 
enough. 
However, for an insufficiently large ?, the IR’’ constraint is binding and cannot be assumed away. 
If IR’’ is binding, we have: 
???(?) − ?(?) = ?∗??(?∗) − ?(?∗) − ? (eq. 19) 
As ?(?) ≡ ???/2, equation 19 is equivalent to: 
???2 = ?(?∗)?2 − ? (eq. 20) 
Therefore, the equilibrium effort in an imperfect competition with a sufficiently small  ? is given by: 
?? = +?(??)? − 2? ? (eq. 21) 
In other words, the relationship between the effort in imperfect competition ?? and in perfect 
competition ?? is monotonic, thus, propositions 4, 5 and 6 still apply.  
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This chapter explores the introduction of size-based proportionality in the prudential 
regulatory framework in Brazil to investigate how such policies affected banks’ growth, and if the 
pattern of such growth impacted concentration. From a competition point of view, size-based 
proportionality has the defining feature of being akin to an artificial capacity constraint, a speed 
bump on growth in the form of prudential requirements only triggered at certain thresholds. Since 
the proportionality thresholds are based on observable characteristics, mainly size as measured 
by total assets or by total exposures, we apply a difference-in-differences matching estimator on 
a comprehensive public dataset maintained by the Central Bank of Brazil. We consider three 
separate prudential rules with embedded size-based proportionality, dealing with liquidity 
requirements, capital requirements and an overall requirement on risk management structures 
that entails variations in supervisory intensity.  
There are two key results. Contrarily to our expectations, the new rules regarding risk 
management structures and supervisory intensity seem to have fostered the relative growth of 
the smaller financial institutions. Similarly, we find some evidence that such differentiation in 
prudential treatment of the institutions at the other end of the spectrum, those greater systemic 
importance and subject to heaviest regulatory burden, had an adverse effect on their growth. 
However, we did not find the same result in respect to the introduction of the capital buffers6 for 
systemically important banks (SIBs) and of the short-term liquidity requirement, over which our 
estimations are inconclusive.  Our interpretation of this apparent puzzle is that we are actually 
observing the effects of a simultaneous regime-change in terms of size-based proportionality and 
not of the new requirements on risk management structures, a topic we further discuss in the next 
section. 
We posit that there are two possible effects from the introduction of size-based 
proportionality in terms of growth and market structure. Either it confers a competitive advantage 
                                                          
6
 A buffer differs from a traditional requirement by being a soft restriction. Banks can breach a buffer on occasion, provided 
they addhere to a set of limitations, usually a cap on dividends. 
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to the smaller institutions by relieving them of costs incurred by larger competitors or it creates a 
moat protecting the largest banks, giving them an edge in the form of higher marginal costs on 
the growth of their competitors not in their peer-group. Furthermore, we conjecture that the 
occurrence of each outcome depends on the nature of the proportionality measure in terms of 
cost. If the measure affects a variable cost, such as a higher capital or liquidity requirement, then 
it is more likely that smaller institutions acquire an advantage, at least in the range until the 
treatment is triggered. On the other hand, if the proportionality policy imposes a mix sunk of costs 
and fixed costs to bigger institutions, such as the need for a more complex risk management 
structure or a new information technology system, then we argue that it is to their benefit in terms 
of competition and may not hinder their growth. 
According to LAUTENSCHLÄGER (2017), the rationale of size-based proportionality is 
the assumption that small banks face greater difficulties in complying with complex regulation. By 
allowing small and medium banks to thrive, she argues that size-based proportionality foster a 
diverse banking sector, which is more stable, as TABAK, FAZIO, and CAJUEIRO (2013) have 
shown using data from Latin American banks. They conclude that a highly unequal banking sector 
is detrimental for the performance of smaller banks and it also decreases the stability of the whole 
system. In fact, some size-based measures were specifically designed to discourage the 
dominance of the so-called too big to fail (TBTF) banks, see, for instance, the framework for 
dealing with domestic SIBs by the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (2012). 
Therefore, even though we distance ourselves from the discussion on financial stability, one 
should not lose sight of its entanglement with competition in evaluating such policies. 
The importance of understanding the competition effects of size-based proportionality is 
due to the fact that it has become a cornerstone of prudential regulation in several jurisdictions. 
A recent survey of the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (2019) indicated that 
85% of its member jurisdictions apply proportionality measures in some form. CARVALHO et al. 
(2017) list examples of proportional approaches in banking regulation and all of them include a 
prominent size dimension in how they are applied.  
In addition to having become a ubiquitous feature of prudential frameworks, pro-
competition policies for the financial sector often assume the analogous form of a regulatory 
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sandbox. In this sort of policy, pioneered by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a British 
regulator, early-stage technologically innovative financial firms, usually called “fintechs”, are 
allowed to operate in a controlled environment that waivers several prudential requirements and 
may even suspend the need of an authorization altogether before they reach a certain scale, as 
TRELEAVEN (2015) discusses. We argue that regulatory sandboxes are an extreme form of size-
based proportionality, for they cleave the prudential framework into two separate domains whose 
threshold is linked to the size of the entity. Therefore, the same considerations may apply. 
2. Proportionality in Brazil 
Beginning in 2017 with the issuance of National Monetary Council Resolution 4,553, all 
financial institutions supervised by the Brazilian Central Bank are to be assigned to one of five 
segments, and both their prudential requirements and the intensity of supervisory procedures 
applied on them varies accordingly. The main driver of segment allocation is the size of the 
financial institution relative to Brazilian GDP. For instance, institutions whose total exposures 
exceed 10% of the Brazilian GDP, roughly the Segment 1, are subject to increased capital and 
liquidity requirements. At the other extreme of the spectrum, Segment 5, comprised of institutions 
whose total assets are less than 0,1% of the Brazilian GDP that adhere to some restrictions on 
activities, has a distinct body of rules with a simplified capital requirements framework that is 
entirely based on accounting rules. Of particular importance to this discussion is the concurrent 
issuance of National Monetary Council Resolution 4,557. According to this rule, the complexity of 
the risk and capital management structures Central Bank supervisors expect to find during 
inspections varies in line with the segment to which the supervised entity belongs, and the 
steepest changes arguably occurs in the transition to Segments 1 and 2. For instance, the 
leverage ratio requirement only applies to these two segments. 
The taxonomy used by CARVALHO et al. (2017) divides the proportionality measures 
into two branches, the categorization approach, according to which banks are segmented in a 
single way for all banking rules, and the specific standard approach, which grants exemptions in 
each prudential standard following some idiosyncratic proportionality criterion. Our understanding 
is that National Monetary Council Resolution 4,553 marked the start of a transition, in the Brazilian 
prudential framework, from a specific standard approach to a categorization approach, that is, it 
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was a regime switch. According to CARVALHO et al (2017), the categorization approach is also 
adopted in Japan and Switzerland. 
In fact, size-based proportionality could be found in the Brazilian prudential framework 
before National Monetary Council Resolution 4,553, but under the specific standard approach. 
Under the specific standard approach then prevailing, each different rule could have its own 
criteria for proportionality and they were not introduced simultaneously. By using this feature, we 
can hope to distinguish variations in their effects on growth and test our conjectures. 
In particular, we try to estimate the effects of National Monetary Council Resolution 4,401, 
issued in February 2015, which brought about a short-term liquidity requirement to banks whose 
total assets surpassed 100 billion Brazilian Reais, and of  National Monetary Council Resolution 
4,443, issued in conjunction with Central Bank of Brazil Circular 3,768 in October 2015, that 
established an additional capital buffer to systemic banks, that is, those whose total exposure is 
above 10% of GDP, approximately 500 billion Brazilian Reais at the time. 
3. Related literature 
Our work is connected to the literature that investigates how prudential requirements 
affects banks’ lending growth and, in particular, how that may affect the credit market structure. 
In this regard, CARLSON et al. (2013) find evidence that relationship between the capital ratio 
and lending is affected by bank size, while KIM and SOHN (2017) find that the liquidity level 
interacts differently with the capital ratio on the effects of the latter on net loans growth depending 
on the size of the bank. However, our main point underlying this work is that understanding size-
based proportionality is fundamentally different, in terms of its effects on competition, from 
prudential requirements applied equally to all institutions or specifically to institutions on a case-
by-case basis, such as Basel Pillar 2 requirements that reflect the supervisory review of the capital 
adequacy of a given institution (e.g. DE JONGHE et al., 2019), a point that, to best of our 
knowledge, has not been addressed by the literature. 
As BRIDGES et al. (2014) argue, idiosyncratic variations in individual bank capital 
requirements might not be comparable to variations affecting all banks. Individual requirements 
are not applied randomly, but are assigned to banks that supervisors deem to have insufficient 
loss-absorbing capacity, thus, their reaction might not be the same of other banks that are not 
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undercapitalized. Besides, the fact that not all banks are subject to same requirement may 
constrain the response of the affected bank through competitive pressures emanating from non-
affected banks. Therefore, our work is in the strand of the literature that investigates prudential 
requirements that differentiate the treatment of banks based on their size.  
GROPP et al. (2018) provide the framework upon which this work is developed, as we 
follow the same empirical strategy. Their strategy is to use the fact that European banks are 
subject to different capital requirements based on their country-specific relative size to implement 
the nearest neighbor matching estimator developed by ABADIE and GUIDO (2002), obtaining 
average treatment effects. They show that treated banks increase their capital ratios not by raising 
equity, but by curbing their supply of credit, a finding we corroborate when analyzing capital 
buffers. 
In addition, we also contribute to the incipient literature that explicitly seeks to understand 
how prudential requirements may affect bank competition, of which the work of 
SCHARGRODSKY and STURZENEGGER (2000) is a noteworthy example. They provide a 
theoretical model in which tighter capital requirements decrease product differentiation, leading 
to higher levels of bank competition. SCHLIEPHAKE and KIRSTEIN (2013) show that capital 
requirements can act like a capacity constraint and change the regime of competition from 
Bertrand to Cournot, in the manner of KREPS and SCHEINKMAN (1983). 
3. Data 
Our data comes from one source, the public IF.DATA database maintained by the Central 
Bank of Brazil. The database follows all Brazilian financial institutions, in three distinct forms of 
consolidation: non-consolidated individual entities, prudential conglomerates and financial 
conglomerates. In this work, we consider the last two forms of consolidation, their differences 
being limited mainly to the incorporation of funds managed by the bank in the prudential 
consolidation. However, while the data on the credit portfolios is more detailed in the financial 
consolidation, the information on prudential requirements is restricted to the prudential 
consolidation, which only began in 2015. Therefore, we cannot run regressions that 
simultaneously consider details of the credit portfolios and of variations in prudential 
requirements, neither can we consider prudential conglomerates in estimating effects of National 
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Monetary Council Resolution 4,401, because there is no observation in that form of consolidation 
prior to its announcement for us to compare. Thus, we focus on the financial consolidation, it is 
used unless noted otherwise. 
The variables used are listed on table 1 below. 
 
4. Results 
We apply the nearest-neighbor matching estimator implemented by ABADIE et al. (2004) 
to obtain the average treatment effect of being placed under different prudential treatments. This 
technique imputes the missing potential outcome for each treated observation by using an 
average of the outcomes of untreated observations closest to the treated observation. The 
closeness between observations is measured by a weighted function of the covariates for each 
observation, the Mahalanobis distance metric. The Mahalanobis distance metric has the 





















Variations in risk-weighted assets pertaining to credit risk, as reported for regulatory purposes.
Variations in total risk-weighted assets, as reported for regulatory purposes.
Ratio of regulatory capital to total risk-weighted assets, as reported for regulatory purposes.
Ratio of common equity capital to total risk-weighted assets, as reported for regulatory purposes.
Variantion in accounting balances pertaining to credit and leasing operations, gross of provisions.
Variation in total assets, as reported for accounting purposes.
Variations in the proportion of the sum of cash and short-term investments over total assets.
Variations in the proportion of equity over total liabilities.
Porpotion of equity over total liabilities.
Table 1. Description and Definition of Variables
Percentage of credit granted to natural persons.
Percentage of total assets composed of securities (bonds, equities and derivatives).
Ratio of credit granted to small and medium enterprises over total credit to legal entities.
Total assets, as reported for accounting purposes.
Percentage of credit classified by institution in the rating for over 90 days past due loans.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the credit portfolio encompassing retail lines (e.g. vehicle financing, house 
financing, credit cards, rural credit).
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the credit portfolio encompassing corporate lines (e.g. working capital, 
investments, receivables, trade finance, revolving lines).
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the credit portfolio encompassing all credit by geographic region (e.g. south, 
southeast, northeast, north, center-east).
Demand deposits (including "Poupança") as a percentage of total liabilities.
Ratio of the sum of interbank deposits and securities-financed transactions over total liabilities.
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for uncorrelated variables with unit variance. When using categorical variables, we do not force 
the chosen untreated observations to conform to the same value displayed by the treated 
observation. 
In pairing similar banks, we consider three sets of characteristics: the credit portfolio, the 
funding profile and ownership. In terms of credit portfolio, we include variables that reflect how it 
is distributed and its quality. As for funding profile, the proportion of retail funding is probably the 
key variable, but we also add the proportion of wholesale funding and of equity funding. Finally, 
we distinguish government-owned banks, since they could have distinct objectives, and banks 
that are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Subsidiaries of large banking groups could potentially tap 
resources outside of their balance sheet that may not be available to otherwise comparable 
banks. All variables are from the end of the quarter prior to the announcement of the measure. 
  However, given the size-based nature of the treatment, we face a peculiar difficulty in 
pairings that explicitly consider total assets. For instance, suppose there are three banks, A, B 
and C. Bank A is barely left out of the treatment, that is, its size is almost that of the threshold, 
while Bank B is left out the treatment by an ample margin. Finally, Bank C is subject to the 
prudential treatment. Comparing Banks A and C might yield contrasting results to those of a match 
between Banks B and C. Bank A may restrain his growth not to incur in the prudential treatment 
or it may simply anticipate the prudential treatment as if already applicable. In the second case, 
we would not observe an effect, even if exists, for there would be no distinction between the 
treatment group and the control group. Therefore, in order to differentiate two possible scenarios 
we run a separate estimation considering size only. 
Therefore, we will consider four estimations in the following sections. In the first, 
characteristics relating to the credit portfolio are considered. Separately, a second estimation 
uses as input statistics on funding, excluding those pertaining to the credit portfolio. In the third, 
both the credit portfolio and the funding profile are jointly considered. Finally, the fourth estimate 
only uses the total assets criterion.  
The liquidity requirement was issued in February 2015, thus, we observe the differences 
arising throughout 2015, comparing statistics at the end of 2015 to these of the end of 2014. 
Similarly, we assume that the additional capital buffer applicable to systemic institutions 
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announced in October 2015 will have produced effects when the end of the third quarter of 2016 
is examined in contrast to the end of the third quarter of 2015. Finally, for the effects of the 
introduction of the categorization approach in proportionality and the associated requirements on 
risk management structures we consider the differences that might have arisen between the last 
quarter of 2017 and the last quarter of 2016, since those measures were made public in final form 
in the first quarter of 2017. 
4.1 Liquidity Requirements 
As mentioned, the liquidity requirement was established by National Monetary Council 
Resolution 4,401. This requirement is the so-called Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), part of the 
Basel III framework, and it seeks to guarantee that banks have high-quality liquid assets in 
sufficient quantity to withstand a 30-day stress scenario. The requirement was announced in final 
form in February 2015 and entered into force in October 2015. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.189719 0.064655 -0.017750 0.007496
Std. Err. 0.208044 0.048501 0.020339 0.009019
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 159 159 159 159
Table 2. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, LCR requirement, same quarter past year





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.067425 0.007699 -0.003786 0.002413
Std. Err. 0.137414 0.038422 0.020137 0.010064
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 159 159 159 159
Table 3. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, LCR requirement, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.063187 0.012209 -0.010925 0.007781
Std. Err. 0.058564 0.030339 0.016385 0.009295
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 158 158 158 158
Table 4. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, LCR requirement, same quarter past year




 The results, as shown in tables 2 through 5 above, are inconclusive in the sense that no 
estimative is different from nil in a statistically significant way. Since we do not have the data on 
prudential conglomerates, we cannot explore it further in that dimension. It should be noted that 
our liquidity index is calculated using balance-sheet data, unlike the regulatory liquidity 
requirement, which is calculated using data on financial resources outflow that is not publicly 
available. 
4.2 Capital buffers 
National Monetary Council Resolution 4,443, issued in conjunction with Central Bank of 
Brazil Circular 3,768 in October 2015, created a capital buffer applicable to SIBs. The norm 
defines as SIBs commercial banks with total exposures above 10% of the Brazilian GDP of the 
year two years previous. The requirement entered into force in January 2017. As mentioned, we 
consider the effects produced until September 2016, assuming that banks would not wait until the 
requirement becomes enforceable to adjust their operations. In fact, we deliberately made the 
option of focusing on announcement dates under that assumption. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.422258 0.096576 -0.019046 0.002339
Std. Err. 0.338929 0.076055 0.030126 0.009742
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 159 159 159 159
Table 5. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, LCR requirement, same quarter past year





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.089575 -0.019755 0.017327 -0.002508
Std. Err. 0.072303 0.063348 0.013892 0.008374
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 163 163 163 163
Table 6. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.107960 -0.031458 0.022922 -0.002265
Std. Err. 0.073127 0.066974 0.014172 0.008410
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 163 163 163 163
Table 7. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.102439 -0.025850 0.021424 -0.002328
Std. Err. 0.072356 0.061575 0.013769 0.008490
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 163 163 163 163
Table 8. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.079655 -0.021510 0.012170 -0.003505
Std. Err. 0.073536 0.057759 0.015638 0.008111
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 163 163 163 163
Table 9. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
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 Even though the results of tables 6 through 9 above do not point to a statistically 
significant reduction in credit growth relative to unaffected banks, banks could be rebalancing 
their portfolio growth towards a reduction in their risk-weighted density, that is, channeling 
resources to exposures with lighter risk-weight factors, as found by GROPP et al. (2018). Based 
on their results, we test this scenario using the prudential conglomerate data and find the results 
displayed in tables 10 and 11 below. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit RWA growth Total RWA growth Basel Index CET1 Index
Treatment Effect -1.069609 *** -4.086142 0.039058 * 0.039402 *
Std. Err. 0.404604 3.407441 0.022069 0.022743
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 348 348 383 383
Table 10. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year




As expected, banks affected by the higher capital buffer did show a difference in their 
indexes pertaining to the measure and, in particular, their risk-weighted assets (RWA) pertaining 
to credit risk grew slower than those of their competitors, pointing to a portfolio being rebalanced, 
a finding convergent to those of GROPP et al. (2018). 
4.3 Risk management structures/ supervisory intensity 
We consider next the allocation to a particular segment defined by National Monetary 
Council Resolutions 4,553 and, thus, being subject to different prudential treatment in terms of 
risk management structures and, possibly, general supervisory intensity. For Segments 1 through 
4, the only criteria for allocation is size relative to GDP, with the exception of a policy bank, 
BNDES, that is excluded from Segment 1. Segment 5 is comprised of Segment 4 institutions that 
abstain from some activities in return of a simplified prudential framework. However, not every 
type of institution can opt for Segment 5, banks, for instance, are ineligible, and a kind of financial 
institution, Microcredit Societies, is compulsorily in Segment 5. We exclude cooperatives from the 
sample, as they represent the bulk of institutions that could effectively choose to follow a simplified 
regime. Therefore, issues relating to self-allocating treatments can be safely ignored, at least 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit RWA growth Total RWA growth Basel Index CET1 Index
Treatment Effect -1.037784 *** -4.038391 0.036392 * 0.038042 *
Std. Err. 0.404410 3.407410 0.021830 0.022431
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 348 348 383 383
Table 11. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, systemic buffer, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
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immediately after the announcement of the measure, a period in which there was no significant 
migration to Segment 5, the only Segment for which such an explicit option exists. 
National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,553 was issued in January 2017, almost 
simultaneously with National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,557, published in February 2017. 
National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,557 fleshed out what the newly established sized-based 
proportionality framework meant in terms of structures for risk management and for capital 
management. National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,557 is mostly a principle-based rule, but 
there are specific exemptions by Segment. For instance, the stress test methodology required 
varies in complexity according to each Segment. More generally, it says that such structures must 
be adequate to the institution’s systemic importance, a principle we interpret as a general link to 
variations in supervisory intensity.  
However, the importance of National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,553 goes well 
beyond National Monetary Council Resolutions 4,557. In fact, it set the building blocks with which 
future prudential requirements will mold their own proportionality. Therefore, financial institutions 
could be factoring in the expectations of future treatment in relation to other norms. In this sense, 
it is hard to ascribe any change we find only to structures for risk management and for capital 
management. Instead, we argue that it could be seen as the effect of size-based proportionality 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.083221 -0.085123 *** 0.023638 * 0.002192
Std. Err. 0.071702 0.038897 0.013214 0.008889
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 12. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 1, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.053884 -0.077227 * 0.028582 ** 0.000260
Std. Err. 0.079870 0.042003 0.014530 0.009390
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 13. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 1, same quarter past year





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.064214 -0.079518 ** 0.027140 ** 0.000335
Std. Err. 0.061574 0.035464 0.011558 0.008482
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 14. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 1, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.045414 -0.078859 * 0.026532 * 0.001807
Std. Err. 0.078201 0.047050 0.014695 0.009701
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 15. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 1, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
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Tables 12 through 15 above consider as treatment the categorization into Segment 1. 
The results presented in them seem to indicate that the treatment impacted the growth of the 
affected institutions, albeit the conclusion regarding credit growth is muddled. However, 
considering the categorization into Segment 1 or Segment 2 as the treatment provides a clearer 
conclusion, as shown in tables 16 through 19 below. Under that framework, we see a consistent 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.151929 ** -0.087822 *** 0.025965 0.003698
Std. Err. 0.060619 0.033946 0.017035 0.007522
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 16. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 1 and 2, same quarter past year






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.154605 ** -0.092724 ** 0.049594 ** 0.001996
Std. Err. 0.072423 0.044660 0.022195 0.008771
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 17. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 1 and 2, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.142290 ** -0.073164 ** 0.035279 ** 0.002049
Std. Err. 0.068429 0.036473 0.017111 0.007976
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 18. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 1 and 2, same quarter past year






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect -0.326430 *** -0.126959 0.071721 *** 0.005057
Std. Err. 0.111530 0.078617 0.023665 0.007780
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 19. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 1 and 2, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.182420 0.135610 -0.028036 -0.035346
Std. Err. 0.161209 0.113971 0.054151 0.031249
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 20. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 5, same quarter past year






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.163332 0.321833 *** 0.049106 -0.079973
Std. Err. 0.262805 0.090766 0.066823 0.056237
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 21. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 5, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.167396 0.169391 * -0.021446 -0.047483
Std. Err. 0.180535 0.099774 0.056569 0.043506
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 22. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 5, same quarter past year




Similarly to what we saw before, we see some evidence of higher growth when the 
categorization into Segment 5 is considered the treatment, as can be viewed in tables 20 through 
23 above, but most robust results are found if two adjacent segments are grouped together. In 
fact, tables 24 through 27 below allow us to draw a clearer picture, as every specification point to 
the same direction regarding credit and asset growth.  In fact, when we define as treatment the 
opposite blocks of the two Segments of the biggest banks and of the smallest banks, the results 
consistently point to a statistically significant higher relative growth of the institutions under the 
simpler prudential frameworks. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.255564 0.217697 * 0.003880 -0.003527
Std. Err. 0.220985 0.123959 0.030165 0.060711
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 23. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segment 5, same quarter past year





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.190326 *** 0.088521 ** -0.002734 -0.007598
Std. Err. 0.059870 0.036970 0.012157 0.007758
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 24. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 4 and 5, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.154253 *** 0.086625 ** -0.020130 * -0.005578
Std. Err. 0.056001 0.037722 0.011474 0.008508
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 25. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 4 and 5, same quarter past year






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.146742 *** 0.076376 ** -0.010101 -0.005630
Std. Err. 0.050543 0.035136 0.013965 0.007811
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Assets % Yes Yes Yes Yes
SME Corporates, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-performing loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Retail Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Corporate Lines Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI Geographic Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand Deposit Funding % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equity Funding, % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Assets No No No No
Government-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 156 156 156 156
Table 26. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 4 and 5, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit growth Asset growth Liquidity index Equity index
Treatment Effect 0.146110 ** 0.111459 ** -0.003851 -0.001917
Std. Err. 0.057527 0.050517 0.016270 0.009676
Variables Included Matching Estimator:
Retail Portfolio % No No No No
Trading Assets % No No No No
SME Corporates, % No No No No
Non-performing loans % No No No No
HHI Retail Lines No No No No
HHI Corporate Lines No No No No
HHI Geographic Region No No No No
Demand Deposit Funding % No No No No
Wholesale Funding, % No No No No
Equity Funding, % No No No No
Total Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government-owned dummy No No No No
Foreign-owned dummy No No No No
Matches 4 4 4 4
Distance metric Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Mahalanobis
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
Table 27. Nearest-neighbor matching estimator for average treatment effect, Segments 4 and 5, same quarter past year
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%; AI Robust Std. Errors
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We find robust empirical evidence that the introduction of a categorization approach in 
the Brazilian prudential framework has been associated with higher relative growth of the financial 
institutions assigned to Segments with simpler, albeit not necessarily lighter, requirements. We 
do not find similar results in the specific standard approach that existed before. Our interpretation 
of the results is that before National Monetary Council Resolution 4,553, proportionality was not 
well defined nor uniform across regulations, and, thus, it was not feasible for financial institutions 
to make long-term plans based on it. In fact, as we have seen, each different rule could have its 
own criteria for proportionality, with limited overlaps and no clear expectation of their continuity in 
future regulations. By establishing an all-encompassing criterion, National Monetary Council 





The main takeaway of this work is that Central Bank policies can shape the market 
structure of the bank sector. We find that assertion unsurprising, since a very important cost for 
banks is a reflex of monetary policy and the way banks operate is constrained by prudential 
policies. However, we argue that this topic has received insufficient attention from the literature 
and that we were able to contribute to its understanding. 
We have concluded that monetary policy can affect bank concentration as long as there 
is a relationship between the size of the bank and the sensitivity of its variable costs to the policy 
rate. In particular, we have verified, using bank-level data, that deposit-funded banks’ loan growth 
is more impervious to variations in the policy rate. We developed a model aligned with this 
observation that allowed us to interpret the compatible empirical results we have found. 
Similarly, we have shown that monetary policy can affect the bank lending spread when 
the policy rate determines which business model is more advantageous. If the level of the policy 
rate favors business models with high barriers of entry, then there would be an effect on bank 
lending spread. We explored this question in the same model and again found empirical results 
compatible with our theoretical reasoning. By doing so, we have provided a new explanation to 
an established phenomenon, that policy rates affect bank lending spreads. 
However, we also find that the market structure of the bank sector can influence the 
effects of Central Bank policies. In investigating prudential policies, we have demonstrated that 
the effects of prudential policies are conditioned by the market structure in a fundamental way. 
We analyzed the issue using a theoretical model that integrates several competition regimes and 
that displays moral hazard. In the model, higher rates worsen borrower incentives. Thus, as 
capital requirement enhance the bankers’ responsiveness to losses, there is the possibility that 
spreads will be reduced to minimize them. Whether this possibility would bear fruits is intrinsically 
a matter of the competition regime. 
In a monopoly, bankers have both the incentive and the room to cut rates in face of higher 
capital requirements. Under intense competition, the dominant effect is the increased funding 
cost, which is necessarily passed along to the borrower. 
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Finally, we have studied the market structure effects of prudential policies that distinguish 
the treatment of banks based on their size. Our study is circumscribed by the specificities involving 
the introduction of Brazilian norms, but we have found evidence that the transition to a framework 
in which all rules are bound to the same criteria has fostered the growth of the smaller institutions. 
That effect potentially reduces bank concentration. 
Bringing together our findings regarding prudential policies, we conclude that the effects 
of prudential policies on bank lending spreads and on market structure is far from preordained. In 
fact, we argue that it is wrong to assume that higher requirements will always lead to wider 
spreads and more bank concentration. The effect on bank lending spreads is contingent on the 
competition regime and the effect on bank concentration depends on the design of the 
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